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NOTES
NONCONSENSUAL SURGERY: THE UNKINDEST CUT OF ALL
I. Introduction
Nonconsensual surgery is a term used to describe a state-ordered operation
to obtain evidence from within an individual's body. This type of surgery
presents serious constitutional questions.' Nonconsensual surgery may violate the
fourth amendment's proscription of unreasonable searches2 as well as the
fourteenth amendment's guarantee of due process.3
Although the Supreme Court had not ruled directly on the issue of non-
consensual surgery, the cases of Rochin v. California,4 Breithaupt u. Abram,' and
Schmerber v. California6 are helpful in an analysis of this problem. In Schmerber,
the Supreme Court held that a nonconsensual blood test performed in a hospital
environment did not constitute an unreasonable search. Breithaupt teaches that
this nonconsensual blood test does not deprive the suspect of his right of due
process. Rochin, on the other hand, held that the circumstances surrounding a
state-ordered stomach pumping violated the suspect's right of due process.
Of course, the bodily intrusions that Rochin, Schmerber, and Breithaupt
discuss are fundamentally different from the surgical incision involved in non-
consensual surgery. Surgery is an intrusion of greater magnitude, and involves
considerably more pain and risk of complications. Nevertheless, the eight Amer-
ican courts7 that have faced the vexing problem of nonconsensual surgery have
1 The fifth amendment provides that a person shall not be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself. U. S. CONST. amend. V. Since honconsensual surgery fre-
quently yields evidence which is used against the suspect at trial, the argument has been made
that the suspect is forced to be a witness against himself in violation of the fifth amendment.
Although this contention is initially appealing, the Supreme Court's ruling in Schmerber
v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), has settled this issue. In Schmerber, the petitioner con-
tended that a nonconsensual blood test forced him to be a witness against himself in viola-
tion of the fifth amendment. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that the
privilege against self-incrimination extends only to communicative and testimonial evidence.
384 U.S. at 761. A blood sample, the Court said, like fingerprints and voice prints, is mere
physical evidence which is not protected by the fifth amendment. Id.
The effect of the Schmerber holding on the nonconsensual surgery area is obvious.
Evidence surgically removed from a suspect and used against him at trial is like a blood
sample: i.e., mere physical evidence. Therefore, as in Schrrerber, nonconsensual surgery in-
volves no fifth amendment violation since the suspect is not compelled to be a witness against
himself in any constitutionally proscribed manner.
2 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. . . 2' U.S. CONST. amend.
IV. The fourth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
See note 3 infra.
3 "No person shall ...be deprived-of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
5 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
6 384 U.S. 757 "(1966).
7 United States v. Crowder, 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1062 (1977); State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977) ; Bowden v. State, 256 Ark. 820,
510,S.W.2d 879 (1974); People v. Smith, 80 Misc.2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1974); Adams
v. State, 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974); Allison v.
State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1145 (1974-);
Creamer v. State, 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 975 '(1973);
State v. Burnett, No. 72-2023 (Cir. Ct. for Crim. Causes, St. Louis, Mo., Dec. 1, 1972).
NOTRE DAME LAWYER
relied on these Supreme Court cases. Four of these courts8 have held the surgery
in question to be constitutionally permissible, and four courts9 have held that the
proposed surgery violates the fourth or fourteenth amendments. This lack of con-
sistency is partly the result of differing interpretations of the Supreme Court
cases and demonstrates the need for a uniform standard in the nonconsensual
surgery area.
Although nonconsensual surgery raises serious constitutional questions, it is
the thesis of this note that nonconsensual surgery does not inevitably violate an
individual's rights. An individual's constitutional right to remain free from
surgical intrusions is not absolute; it must be balanced against the competing
interests of the state in securing this evidence.
An analysis of the seven reported" nonconsensual surgery cases will show
that the central controversy in this area involves the standard to be used in
evaluating the conflicting interests of the state and the individual. Accordingly,
this note will present a uniform standard which should be used when a state is
faced with the problem of nonconsensual surgery. The use of this standard will
allow a state to compel an individual to submit to surgery without abridging his
right to be free from unreasonable searches under the fourth amendment, and to
due process under the fourteenth amendment.
II. The Supreme Court Bodily Intrusion Cases
A. The Fourth Amendment and Nonconsensual Surgery
No constitutional right is more fundamental than the fourth amendment's
restriction against unreasonable searches and seizures." The fourth amendment
protects a person's dignity and privacy against unwarranted intrusions by the
state by constraining all searches which are unreasonable under the circum-
stances. 2 The courts protect this right of freedom from unreasonable searches
by excluding evidence obtained in contravention of the fourth amendment. 3
Nonconsensual surgery involves a "search" since an individual's justifiable
expectation of privacy is violated by such an operation.'4 The central question
8 The Crowder, Allison, Creamer, and Burnett courts held that, under the circumstances,
nonconsensual surgery did not violate the suspect's rights. See note 7 supra.
9 The Overstreet and Adams courts each held that the nonconsensual surgery performed
on the suspect violated his rights. The courts in Bowden and Smith refused to permit major
nonconsensual surgery because it would violate the suspect's rights. See note 7 supra.
10 State v. Burnett, No. 72-2023 (Cir. Ct. for Grim. Causes, Dec. 1, 1972), is an unre-
ported St. Louis, Missouri trial court decision.
11 Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250 (1891).
12 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
13 The purpose of the rule excluding evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment
is to discourage lawless police conduct. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914).
The Supreme Court has further noted that without the exclusionary rule the constitutional
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures would be a "mere form of words." Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961). Mapp held that the federal exclusionary rule, adopted for
federal prosecutions in Weeks, must be applied in criminal prosecutions in state courts.
14 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). In this case, Katz was convicted of
transmitting wagering information by telephone in violation of federal statute. At his trial, the
government introduced evidence which they obtained by placing an electronic listening and
recording device on the outside of a public telephone booth Katz had used. On appeal, Katz
alleged that this electronic eavesdropping constituted an illegal search and seizure. The
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is whether this surgical search is reasonable and therefore permissible under the
fourth amendment. In addressing this problem, the nonconsensual surgery cases
have relied on the landmark case of Schmerber v. California."
In Schmerber, the petitioner was involved in a car accident and hospitalized.
While in the hospital, a police officer noticed the smell of liquor on Schmerber's
breath and asked him to take a blood test? On advice of counsel, Schmerber
refused. Nevertheless, the officer directed a physician to take a blood sample.
Based on the results of this nonconsensual blood test, Schmerber was convicted of
driving while intoxicated.'
Schmerber contended that the results of the blood test should have been
excluded as the product of an illegal search and seizure. 8 The Supreme Court
noted that the blood test was given in a hospital environment under strict medical
safeguards, 9 and that the state has a great interest in deterring drunk drivers.
The majority concluded that, since blood tests are commonplace and generally
involve no risk, trauma, or pain, Schmerber's blood test was reasonable and not
violative of the fourth amendment."0 The holding in Schmerber, however, was
carefully limited:
It bears repeating, however, that we reach this judgment only on the facts
of the present record. The integrity of an individual's person is a cherished
value of our society. That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid
the States minor intrusions into an individual's body under stringently
limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits more substantial
intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions. 2'
Schmerber thus stands solely for the proposition that a nonconsensual blood test
performed under strict medical safeguards is a minor intrusion which does not
violate the fourth amendment.
Caution must be used in applying the Schmerber holding to the noncon-
sensual surgery area. Although both blood tests and nonconsensual surgery in-
volve bodily intrusions, there is a fundamental difference between the pinprick in
Schmerber and the intrusion of a surgeon's scalpel. Moreover, the reasons the
Court advanced to authorize blood tests in Schmerber do not apply to noncon-
sensual surgery. Schmerber allowed the blood test because it was commonplace
Supreme Court reversed his conviction and held that the government's activities constituted
an illegal search since they had unreasonably violated Katz's justifiable expectation of privacy.
Id. at 353.
15 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 758.
18 See note 13 sapra.
19 Finally the record shows that the test was performed in a reasonable manner. Peti-
tioner's blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to ac-
cepted medical practices. We are thus not presented with the serious questions
which would arise if a search involving use of medical technique, even of the most
rudimentary sort, were made by other than medical personnel or in other than a
medical environment-for example, if it were administered by police in the privacy
of the stationhouse. To tolerate searches under these conditions might be to invite
an unjustified element of personal risk of infection and pain.
384 U.S. at 771, 772.




and routine.22 By contrast, surgery is not common and involves physical and
mental discomfort. Unlike a blood test, surgery involves anesthesia, post-opera-
tive painkillers, stitches and scars. In addition, surgery involves a significantly
higher risk of infection, post-surgery complications, as well as an immensely
greater personal intrusion. Further, blood tests were allowed by the Schmerber
Court because of their possible deterrent effect on drunk drivers.23 The threat of
surgery to retrieve evidence, however, would not similarly deter criminals.
These basic differences indicate that although Schmerber does not explicitly
forbid nonconsensual surgery, it cannot be read to authorize all surgical intrusions
into an individual's body. As discussed earlier, Schmerber is instructive because
it deals with a constitutionally permissible intrusion into an individual's body.
Schmerber indicates that a nonconsensual intrusion will be considered reasonable
under the fourth amendment only when the state's interest in collecting this im-
bedded evidence is carefully weighed against the nature and extent of the in-
trusion and the individual's interest in preserving the sanctity of his body. 4
B. Due Process and Nonconsensual Surgery
The fourteenth amendment states that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.2" Past Supreme Court decisions
demonstrate that due process is a flexible concept;26 its contours are necessarily
vague and indefinite.2 In the criminal context, the Court safeguards the con-
stitutional guarantee of due process by scrutinizing the entire course of proceed-
ings to determine whether convictions have been obtained by methods that offend
a sense of justice."
The Supreme Court has recognized that forcible state intrusions into an in-
dividual's body raise due process questions. In Rochin v. California,29 for ex-
ample, deputy sheriffs forced their way into Rochin's bedroom after receiving in-
formation that Rochin was selling narcotics. While in Rochin's bedroom, the
sheriffs spotted two capsules, which Rochin quickly swallowed." The sheriffs
grabbed Rochin and unsuccessfully tried to force the capsules from his mouth.
Rochin was then taken to a hospital where an emetic solution was forced into
his stomach. The two recovered capsules contained narcotics, and Rochin was
convicted of possession of morphine."
22 Id.
23 "[Elxtraction of blood samples for testing is a highly effective means of determining the
degree to which a person is under the influence of alcohol." Id. at 771.
24 In other words, the questions we must decide in this case are whether the police were
justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means
and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment
standards of reasonableness.
Id. at 768.
25 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26 See, e.g., Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945); Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.,
260 U.S. 22 '(1922).
27 See, e.g., F. Pollock, The History of the Law of Nature, EssAYs IN THF_ LAW 31-79
(1922).
28 Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
29 342 U.S. 165 (1952).




On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Rochin's conviction because the
capsules were obtained by methods that violated the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Rochin Court said:
[R]egard for the requirements of the due process clause inescapably imposes
upon this Court an exercise of judgement upon the whole course of proceed-
ings in order to ascertain whether they offend these canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples
even toward those charged with the most heinous offenses.
3 2
The Court held that due process had been violated because the techniques used
to wrest the capsules from Rochin were "too close to the rack and screw to
permit of constitutional differentiation.""
The Supreme Court did not hold nonconsensual stomach pumping to be a
per se violation of the fourteenth amendment." Rather, Rochin held that due
process is violated when the totality of circumstances shows that evidence is
gathered in a manner which "shocks the conscience.""
Another Supreme Court case involving a due process challenge to a non-
consensual bodily intrusion is Breithaupt v. Abram." After being knocked un-
conscious in a serious automobile accident, Breithaupt was taken to the emer-
gency room of a nearby hospital. A policeman noticed the smell of liquor on
Breithaupt's breath and directed a physician to take a blood sample. Analysis
showed that Breithaupt's blood contained .17% alcohol. Based upon this un-
authorized blood test, Breithaupt was convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 7
Breithaupt challenged his conviction by relying on Rochin and alleging that
his right to due process was violated by this nonconsensual blood test. The
Supreme Court, however, affirmed Breithaupt's conviction and held that a non-
consensual blood test administered in a hospital environment does not violate due
process.3 " The Court distinguished this case from Rochin by noting that there
was nothing brutal or offensive in the taking of a blood sample under the super-
vision of a physician." The holding was also based on the fact that blood tests
are so common. As the Court stated:
The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday life. It is a
ritual for those going into the military service as well as those applying for
marriage licenses. Many colleges require such tests before permitting en-
trance and literally millions of us have voluntarily gone through the same,
though a longer routine, in becoming blood donors.
4 0
32 342 U.S. at 169 (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 416-17 (1945)).
33 342 U.S. at 172.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 435.
39 We set aside the conviction [Rochin's] because such conduct "shocked the conscience"
and was so "brutal" and "offensive" that it did not comport with traditional ideas of
fair play and decency. We therefore found that the conduct was offensive to due
process. But we see nothing comparable here to the facts in Rochin.
Basically the distinction rests on the fact that there is nothing "brutal" or"offensive" in the taking of a sample of blood when done, as in this case, under the
protective eye of a physician.
Id.
40 Id. at 436.
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The Court noted that a blood test is a scientifically accurate measurement of
alcohol in the blood. Moreover, the Breithaupt Court reasoned that allowing this
test could have a deterrent effect on other intoxicated drivers on the highway.4
The Court concluded that these considerations far outweighed an individual's
interest in immunity from bodily intrusions."
Rochin and Breithaupt are instructive since they discuss nonconsensual
bodily intrusions in the context of due process. Schmerber and Breithaupt show
that a state's interest in keeping its citizens safe and in apprehending criminals
can outweigh a suspect's interest in keeping his body free from intrusions. Rochin
indicates that the method of the bodily intrusion must be carefully scrutinized to
ensure adherence to due process.
These Supreme Court bodily intrusion cases are relevant to the noncon-
sensual surgery area because they show that a court should apply a balancing test
to assess the validity of bodily intrusions ordered by the state. Of course, these
cases are not dispositive of the nonconsensual surgery issue since a surgical in-
cision is considerably more intrusive than the needle prick in Breithaupt and
Schmerber, or the stomach pumping in Rochin.
III. The Nonconsensual Surgery Cases
Six of the American nonconsensual surgery cases have involved minor
surgery. In these cases, the evidence could be removed from the suspect in a
brief operation using only a local anesthetic.43 Generally, these operations pose
little risk to the suspect's life. Two of the nonconsensual surgery cases, however,
have involved major surgery. In major surgery, a general anesthetic4 is required
and the operation poses a substantial threat to the suspect's life.
A. Minor Surgery
The first American case allowing nonconsensual surgery to retrieve evidence
from a suspect's body was Creamer v. State.4" After Creamer was implicated in
a double murder, the police noticed that he had a bullet entry wound, but no
exit wound. Police-ordered x-rays showed a piece of steel superficially lodged
in Creamer's chest. Upon application for a search warrant to authorize surgery
41 The test upheld here is not attacked on the ground of any basic deficiency or
of injudicious application, but admittedly is a scientifically accurate method of
detecting alcoholic content in the blood, thus furnishing an exact measure upon
which to base a decision as to intoxication. Modern community living requires
scientific methods of crime detection lest the public go unprotected. The increasing
slaughter on our highways, most of which should be avoidable, now reaches the
astounding figures only heard of on the battlefield.
Id. at 439.
42 Id.
43 A local anesthetic is used to render a selected part of the body insensitive to pain. The
drug is topically applied and the patient does not lose consciousness. Local anesthetic achieves
its effect by blocking the conduction of nerve impulses to and from a well-defined area. See
J. WILSON & J. McDONALD, HANDBOOK OF SURGERY (1960).
44 A general anesthetic is introduced into the bloodstream and transported to the central
nervous system. A general anesthetic can cause analgesia, amnesia, unconsciousness, and loss
of reflexes and muscle tone. See J. WILSON & J. McDONALD, supra note 43.
45 229 Ga. 511, 192 S.E.2d 350 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 975 (1973).
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to retrieve the bullet, the Ge6rgia trial court ordered Creamer transported to a
local hospital for surgery. Creamer appealed the order on the ground that the
proposed surgery violated his right to be free from unreasonable searches.
"
This contention was dismissed by the Georgia Supreme Court, which interpreted
Schmerber as allowing all minor intrusions into a person's body. Since Creamer's
proposed surgery was minor, the court held that this operation constituted a
minor intrusion which did not violate Creamer's fourth amendment rights."
The Georgia Supreme Court made two fundamental errors in applying the
Schmerber criteria to the nonconsensual surgery area. First, Schmerber did not
authorize all minor intrusions into the body.
8 Schmerber was limited to the
authorization of the minor intrusion of 'a blood test in a hospital environment.
The Schmerber Court specifically stated that it reached "this judgement only on
the facts of the present record"
4 " and that its holding did not automatically
permit intrusions under other conditions."
Secondly, the Creamer court erroneously equated minor surgery with the
minor intrusion of the blood test performed on Schmerber.
5 The court failed to
realize that even surgery which is medically determined to be minor involves an
incision more intrusive than the needle prick necessary for a blood test.
2
Although the Creamer court was incorrect in assuming that Schmerber
would permit all minor surgery, it is the focus of this note that some minor
surgery is constitutionally permissible. The most analytical case in this area,
United States v. Crowder,53 shows that the state can compel an individual to
submit to minor surgery without violating his rights. The Crowder case is par-
ticularly important because it was decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. Since the other nonconsensual surgery
cases were decided by state courts, this is the most influential court yet to rule
on the issue of nonconsensual surgery. When nonconsensual surgery cases arise
46 Id. at 514, 192 S.E.2d at 352.
47 Id. at 515, 192 S.E.2d at 353.
48 See text accompanying note 19 supra.
49 384 U.S. at 772.
50 Id.
51 229 Ga. at 515, 192 S.E.2d at 353.
52 Another Georgia nonconsensual surgery case decided shortly after Creamer, was Al-
lison v. State, 129 Ga. App. 364, 199 S.E.2d 587 (1973). Allison was convicted of robbery by
force after an incriminating bullet was surgically removed from his right side. On appeal, the
Georgia Court of Appeals reluctantly affirmed the introduction of the bullet into evidence.
Allison is chiefly noteworthy because the majority realized the errors the Creamer court
made in applying the Schmerber criteria to the nonconsensual surgery area. The Allison court
stated:
The writer [Judge Evans of the Court of Appeals of Georgia] also believes that
the Georgia Supreme Court misinterpreted Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), in the Creamer opinion wherein the extraction of a minute quantity of a
person's blood was considered a minor intrusion into an individual's body. From
reading Justice Brennan's opinion in Schmerber it is very doubtful that the Supreme
Court would extend that case further, for a surgical knife is considerable [sic] more in-
trusion into the human body than a mere needle inserted for blood testing . . . . this
writer, I repeat, if free to do so, would reverse. But, I am bound by Creamer, and
the denial of the motion to suppress the bullet removed from the defendant's body
through surgery was not error.
129 Ga. App. at 365, 199 S.E.2d at 589.
53 543 F.2d 312 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1062 (1977).
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in the future, it is likely that the analysis and procedures outlined in Crowder will
be used as a model.5 4
Crowder was implicated in the murder of a dentist. After Crowder's arrest,
the police noticed that his wrist and knee were bandaged. An x-ray examination
revealed that bullets, which appeared to be of the same caliber that killed the
dentist, were lodged in Crowder's wrist and knee. The State's Attorney applied
to the district court for an order authorizing surgical removal of the bullet super-
ficially lodged in Crowder's right wrist. The Senior Medical Officer of the
District of Columbia jail presented an affidavit which stated that the bullet could
be removed from Crowder's right wrist with little risk to him. 5 The physician
stated that in his medical opinion the operation to remove the bullet from
Crowder's wrist would constitute minor surgery. 7
The district court found probable cause to believe that Crowder had com-
mitted the murder and that evidence of the crime was located in Crowder's wrist.
The court authorized the surgery to remove the bullet from Crowder's wrist on
the ground that the contemplated operation was a permissible intrusion under
Schmerber.8
Before the operation was performed, however, Crowder was given a chance
to apply for appellate review of the order. The United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit denied a writ of prohibition against execu-
tion of the order. Consequently, the operation to remove the bullet was suc-
cessfully carried out under stringent medical conditions. Based upon this ex-
tracted evidence, Crowder was convicted of second-degree murder, robbery, and
carrying a dangerous weapon. 5
This case again came before the United States Court of Appeals on an ap-
peal from the denial of the motion to suppress the evidence removed from
Crowder's wrist. The court concluded that the bullet had been properly ad-
mitted, and affirmed the conviction."
In doing so, the Crowder court discussed a number of significant factors.
The court noted that Crowder had been afforded counsel at an adversary hear-
ing before a neutral and detached magistrate. The magistrate had found prob-
able cause to believe both that Crowder had committed the crime and that
evidence of that crime was imbedded in his wrist.0" The state had also proven
that the evidence was vital to its case and could be obtained in no other way.
54 Indeed, the most recent nonconsensual surgery case, State v. Overstreet, 551 S.W.2d
621 (Mo. 1977), held that nonconsensual surgery violated a suspect's rights unless the careful
procedures in Crowder were followed. Id. at 627-28. See discussion in text supra, at IIIa.
55 543 F.2d at 313.
56 The Medical Officer stated that it would be medically inadvisable to remove the bullet
from Crowder's knee. Id.
57 It is therefore my medical opinion, based upon reasonable medical certainty, that
the surgical removal of the slug would not involve any harm or risk of injury to Mr.
Crowder's arm or hand or the use thereof. The surgical removal of the slug would
be considered as minor surgery.
Id.
58 Id. at 314.
59 Id. at 313.
60 Id. at 318.
61 Id. at 316.
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Finally, the magistrate allowed appellate review of the order before the opera-
tion.
The Crowder court then reviewed the operation itself and the circumstances
in which it was performed. Medical testimony established that this was a minor
operation: it was performed in ten minutes, with the aid of a local anesthetic.
The court also noted the adherence to maximum medical precautions.62 Although
this same operation was normally performed on an outpatient basis, Crowder
remained in the hospital for observation for four days after the operation. 3
Moreover, the court emphasized that unlike the situation in Rochin, no force
was used on Crowder. The court of appeals thus held that this operation did not
violate Crowder's right to due process or his right to be free from unreasonable
searches. 4
In a strong dissent, Judge Robinson contended that the nonconsensual
surgery performed on Crowder was an unreasonable search violative of the fourth
amendment.65 Judge Robinson pointed out that the Schmerber holding could
not be extended to nonconsensual surgery because the reasons for allowing blood
tests do not apply to surgery. The Schmerber court allowed the blood test because
it was commonplace and had a deterrent effect on drunk drivers. Surgery, on the
other hand, is an extraordinary procedure which would have no deterrent effect
on prospective criminals.6"
The dissent also predicted that courts in the future may mistakenly rely on
Crowder as permitting all minor surgical intrusions without due regard for the
careful procedures followed by the Crowder court. Judge Robinson felt that since
future nonconsensual surgery cases might involve circumstances totally different
from those in Crowder, courts would have difficulty determining exactly which
combination of factors satisfies the broadly worded constitutional standards."7
The most recent nonconsensual surgery case, State v. Overstreet,"8 also in-
volved minor surgery. In Overstreet, the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder and first-degree robbery after an incriminating bullet was surgically re-
moved from his buttocks. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed Overstreet's
conviction because the state had not adhered to the careful procedures followed
62 The surgeon who operated on Crowder said that "because the bullet was removed by
court order, without the consent of Crowder we bent over backwards to make sure from the
surgical point of view that he had every protection." Id. at 315.
63 Id.
64 In any event, we are not here called upon to give general approval of surgical
operations in search of evidence. We are concerned only with the procedures followed




66 Id. at 321.
67 I am unable to view calmly this court's action in sanctioning new and far
greater bodily exploration than the ubiquitous needle-insertion permitted in
Schmerber. By extending that decision to all instances of so-called "minor surgery,"
the court paves the way for judicial approval of any evidentiary expedition which
on its own facts might seem to fall within that ill-defined limit. There are, I
believe, grave dangers inseparably incidental to the precedent the court thus sets.
Id. at 322 (Robinson, J., dissenting).
68 551 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977).
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in Schmerber and Crowder.9 Specifically, the Missouri court held that a suspect
must be provided an adversary hearing and an opportunity for appellate review
before a court order compelling surgery can issue.7" The Missouri Supreme
Court held that nonconsensual surgery complies with the fourth amendment only
when the procedures enunciated in Crowder and Schmerber are followed. 7'
The Indiana Supreme Court reached a contrary result in Adams v. State,7
in which nonconsensual surgery was held to be a per se violation of the fourth
amendment. In Adams, the defendant was charged with killing a police officer
during the course of a supermarket robbery. After bullet fragments were sur-
gically removed from his hips and buttocks and introduced in evidence against
him, Adams was convicted of premeditated murder and felony murder.7 '
On appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed Adams' conviction,
stating:
We are confronted with an intrusion of the most serious magnitude. Here
an actual surgical operation was performed on the Appellant to remove a
bullet from inside his body. We do not sanction a surgical operation forced
on a defendant for this purpose. We therefore hold that the Fourth Amend-
ment prohibits the type of intrusion into the body of the suspect as occurred
in this case.74
In the future, courts or legislatures may follow Adams and decide that non-
consensual minor surgery is a per se constitutional violation. This is entirely
proper since the Supreme Court has not indicated a position on this issue. Even
if it is finally determined that such surgery is not a per se constitutional violation,
a state under its own constitution may grant its citizens greater protection than
that required by the Federal Constitution. Nevertheless, the weight of present
authority is that minor nonconsensual surgery, under carefully controlled pro-
cedures, does not inevitably violate the fourth amendment or the requirement of
due process.7'
B. Major Surgery
The nonconsensual cases examined thus far have concerned minor surgery,
where the proposed operation posed little risk to the suspect's life. By contrast,
major nonconsensual surgery, with its attendent trauma, pain, and greater threat
to life, presents a more troubling constitutional question.
The first case in which the state requested an order authorizing major
surgery was Bowden v. State.76 In Bowden, a man fleeing from the scene of a
69 The Missouri Supreme Court asked, "Did what occurred in this case meet the require-
ments as laid down in Schmerber as amplified and applied in Crowder? We conclude not."
Id. at 627.
70 Id. at 627-28.
71 Id.
72 260 Ind. 663, 299 N.E.2d 834 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
73 Id. at 664, 299 N.E.2d at 835.
74 Id. at 668, 299 N.E.2d at 838.
75 But see Note, Surgery and the Search for Evidence: United States v. Crowder, U.
PITT. L. REV. which argues that nonconsensual surgery is a fitting area for the adoption of a
per se rule.
76 256 Ark. 820, 510 S.W.2d 879 (1974).
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robbery-murder was shot with a .38 caliber gun. A few minutes later, Bowden
appeared at a local hospital suffering from a bullet wound. X-rays revealed that
a bullet, similar to a .38 caliber slug, was lodged in his spinal cord.
The Arkansas court approved a search warrant application authorizing
removal of the bullet. Pending the operation, however, the court permitted
Bowden to apply to the Supreme Court of Arkansas for a temporary stay of this
warrant." At this hearing, physicians testified that the removal of the bullet
would require a general anesthetic and would constitute major surgery. The
physicians also said that removal of the bullet would cause a worsening of
Bowden's condition due to the involvement of the spinal nerves. On the basis of
this testimony, the Arkansas Supreme Court held that the operation was a major
intrusion involving pain, trauma, and possible loss of life. 8 Since this operation
went beyond the permissible boundaries set out in Schmerber and Rochin, the
court quashed the search warrant. 9
The only other nonconsensual surgery case involving a major operation is
People v. Smith."0 In this case, a New York district attorney suspected Smith of
murdering a New York City policeman. Police-ordered x-rays showed a metallic
foreign body lodged beneath Smith's posterior chest wall but outside the actual
breast cavity.8"
A physician examined Smith and submitted a report to the court. The
doctor reported that removal of the bullet would take one hour. The doctor
added that a general anesthetic would be needed and that he considered this
operation major surgery. 2 The physician reported that the surgery would require
an incision six inches long. The incision would be deepened through the tissue
under the skin and then through the large muscles in the back of the neck. The
next layer of muscles would then be split and pushed aside. After the bullet was
retrieved, the incision would have to be closed in layers. A rubber drain would
then be placed in the incision for twenty-four to forty-eight hours. The physician
said that the general anesthetic used in the surgery could cause cardiac arrest and
certain respiratory problems. Moreover, medical tests indicated that the bullet
was not harmful and could stay imbedded in Smith for the rest of his life. 3
The New York Supreme Court held that the contemplated operation con-
stituted a major intrusion into Smith's body. 4 The trauma, pain, and possible
loss of life which this operation entailed clearly went beyond the criteria set out
77 Id. at 821, 510 S.W.2d at 879.
78 The two doctors who examined Bowden testified that in their medical opinion, the
proposed operation constituted a "major intrusion" into the suspect's body. Id. at 824, 510
S.W.2d at 881.
79 The Arkansas Supreme Court said that "in applying the requirements of Schmerber,
in the case at bar, we hold that the issuance of the search warrant does not meet the stringent
standard of reasonableness there enunciated." Id.
80 80 Misc.2d 210, 362 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1974).
81 Id. at 211, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 910.
82 Id. at 212, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 911.
83 Id. at 214, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
84 The court held that:
the proposed operation would constitute a major intrusion into the body of the
respondent that would involve trauma and pain and possible risk of life and is over
and beyond the major intrusion set down in Schmerber v. California, supra.
Id. at 216, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 914.
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in Schmerber and Rochin. Accordingly, the court refused to allow the operation
because it would violate Smith's fourteenth amendment right of due process and
freedom from unreasonable searches.
Smith and Bowden are the first nonconsensual surgery cases involving an
operation which constituted a substantial threat to the suspects' lives. Both courts
correctly decided that the fourth and fourteenth amendments forbid such major
intrusions no matter how compelling the state's need for the evidence.
The minor surgery in Creamer, Crowder and Overstreet is fundamentally
different from the major surgery involved in Smith and Bowden. Crowder shows
that it is possible for the state to prove a compelling need for evidence super-
ficially imbedded in a suspect's body. The carefully drawn surgical order and
meticulous medical precautions in Crowder insured that the demands of due
process and the fourth amendment were met. Crowder is an example of a non-
consensual operation which is not "brutal" or shocking to the conscience.
On the other hand, Bowden and Smith provide examples of major non-
consensual surgery inherently violative of both due process and the fourth amend-
ment. The operations in both Bowden and Smith posed a clear risk to the life of
the suspect. Permitting such a major operation would not only constitute an
unreasonable search but it would also offend a "sense of justice" and "shock the
conscience.""
IV. A Uniform Standard
The cases have shown that the basic problem in the nonconsensual surgery
area is in determining when the proposed surgery meets the demands of due
process and the fourth amendment. Despite the various factual situations in
which the question of nonconsensual surgery may arise, the competing values
would be the same from case to case. The state's interest in convicting criminals
and in protecting its citizens must be balanced against an individual's interest in
avoiding bodily intrusions. Therefore, a uniform standard should be utilized
whenever a state seeks to compel a person to undergo surgery.
The following suggested standard establishes a rigid set of criteria which
should be followed before a court order compelling surgery can issue. If this
standard is followed, nonconsensual surgery can be performed without violating
a suspect's constitutional rights. Adherence to this standard would eliminate the
inconsistency and confusion that have marked the cases in the nonconsensual
surgery area.
A. A Major Surgery/Minor Surgery Dichotomy
A prosecutor who has reason to believe that a suspect has evidence of a
crime within his body should first apply for a search warrant to surgically re-
trieve this evidence. The court considering the application should then require
medical examination of the suspect. The suspect should be examined by his own
doctor and by the prosecutor's doctor to determine the safety, necessity, and
possible effects of the proposed operation.
85 See note 35 supra.
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The doctors' first decision should be whether the proposed operation would
be major or minor surgery. It must be stressed that this would be a medical
determination. Such medical factors as the type of anesthetic to be used, the
risk to the suspect, the possibility of infection, and the medical necessity for the
operation would play a part in this decision.
If the suspect's doctor and the prosecutor's doctor disagree, the judge would
appoint his own medical expert. This expert would study both doctors' reports,
examine the suspect, and present a final opinion as to whether the contemplated
surgery was major or minor. Since this initial decision would be medically
determined, the judge is not forced to make a decision outside his expertise.
This minor surgery/major surgery dichotomy is implicit in some of the
nonconsensual surgery cases. In order to have a uniform, consistent method of
examining requests for orders compelling surgery, however, doctors who examine
the suspect should make a specific medical determination as to whether the pro-
posed operation is major or minor. Only in Crowder, Bowden, Overstreet, and
Smith, did the physician specifically decide whether the contemplated operation
was major or minor. In Creamer, the medical evidence went to show that the
operation could be performed safely. In Adams, the medical testimony showed
that the operation could be performed with a local anesthetic. As discussed
earlier, these are only two of the factors involved in a minor operation.
1. Major Surgery: Per Se Constitutional Violation
If it is medically determined that the suspect's operation would be major
surgery, the search warrant should not issue. Nonconsensual major surgery
should be a per se violation of both the fourth and fourteenth amendments. The
court in Rochin said that an act violated due process when it "shocked the con-
science" 6 and "offended the canons of decency and fairness which express the
notions of justice of English-speaking people.""7 Surely a major operation, in
which the life of a suspect may be endangered, is more repugnant to the court
than the forced stomach pumping in Rochin. Major surgery, with its attendant
risk, trauma, pain, and affront to dignity, should accordingly be considered a
per se violation of the fourth amendment. Major surgery is dearly a major in-
trusion which is forbidden by Schmerber.8 s
2. Minor Surgery: Constitutional Criteria
a. Prosecutorial Burden
If the proposed operation was medically determined to be minor, the
prosecutor would then have the burden of satisfying a number of different
criteria. The prosecutor should be required to demonstrate at a judicial adversary
hearing that he has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed the
crime and that evidence of that crime is within the suspect's body. Furthermore,
86 342 U.S. at 172.
87 Id. at 169.
88 384 U.S. at 772.
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the prosecutor should have to show that this evidence is vital to his investigation,
and could not be obtained in any other way. The suspect should also be able to
cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses and present his own witnesses.8 9
In all of the minor surgery cases there was probable cause that the suspect
committed the crime and that evidence of that crime was in his body. In
Creamer, however, there was no proof that the evidence was vital or otherwise
available. Only in Crowder did the court establish that these criteria had been
met.
In order to justify this surgery, the crime with which the suspect is charged
must be a serious felony, such as murder or kidnapping. As discussed earlier, the
state must show a compelling interest in this evidence in order to outweigh an
individual's immunity from bodily intrusions. The state's need to protect its
citizens from violent crimes is one factor which establishes this compelling
interest. The murders in Creamer, Crowder, Overstreet, and Adams would
qualify as such a felony, but such lesser crimes as robbery or burglary would not."
b. Appellate Review
If the prosecutor satisfies all these criteria, the court should issue a search
warrant authorizing this minor operation. As in Bowden, Crowder, and Creamer,
however, the suspect must be given a temporary stay of this order so he can
apply for appellate review of this search warrant.
It is crucial that the suspect be afforded the chance for appellate review
before the operation is performed. Adams and Overstreet failed in this respect,
because appellate review was given to the suspect only after the operation had
taken place.
If the higher court reviews this surgical order, and decides that the criteria
have been satisfied, the operation should take place. As in Crowder, however,
this surgery must take place in a hospital under the strictest medical safeguards.
This proffered uniform standard should produce consistent results in this
area. It is true that this standard is so rigorous, that it will be the rare case in
which the prosecutor will be able to obtain the order authorizing surgery. Of the
cases examined, perhaps only Crowder was able to fulfill the criteria. Neverthe-
less, it is appropriate to place this burden on the prosecutor because of the con-
siderations involved. Even a minor operation involves considerable affront to
a person's dignity. As the court said in Schmerber, "The integrity of an in-
dividual's person is a cherished value in our society."'" It is fitting that the state
be required to show a compelling need for this surgery before a person's usual
immunity from bodily intrusions is overcome.
V. Conclusion
Nonconsensual surgery presents the basic question of whether the state may
89 See, e.g., State v. Overstreet, 552 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. 1977).
90 It is also doubtful if the attempted robbery in Allison would qualify as such a serious
felony. See note 52 supra.
91 384 U.S. at 772.
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reach inside the human body to extract evidence surgically. A compulsory oper-
ation raises obvious constitutional issues. It is the focus of the note, however, that
nonconsensual surgery is not necessarily a violation of the fourth amendment's
proscription of unreasonable searches or of the fourteenth amendment's guar-
antee of due process. The difficult problem lies in ascertaining what criteria
should be used in measuring the state's interest in convicting criminals against
the suspect's interest in keeping his body free from intrusions.
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on nonconsensual surgery, the
Rochin, Breithaupt and Schmerber cases are helpful by way of analogy. In these
cases the Supreme Court defined permissible bodily intrusions. In Rochin and
Breithaupt, the Court indicated that an intrusion violated the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment when it "shocks the conscience" or offends a sense
of fairness. The blood test in Schmerber was held to be a permissible minor in-
trusion under the fourth amendment because it provided a deterrent against
drunk drivers, involved no risk or trauma, and was given in a hospital environ-
ment.
The nonconsensual surgery cases have attempted, with varying degrees of
success, to come to grips with this difficult problem. Smith and Bowden cor-
rectly decided that nonconsensual major surgery was not permissible. Creamer
authorized minor surgery after mistakenly interpreting Schmerber as authorizing
all minor intrusions. The Overstreet court followed Crowder and held that a
suspect must be afforded a judicial adversary hearing and an opportunity for
appellate review before a surgical order could issue. The Adams court opted for
the highest degree of protection for its citizens by banning all nonconsensual
surgery. Only the Crowder case provided a thoughtful analysis of the constitu-
tional problems that a state-ordered operation presents. The Crowder court con-
cluded that under certain circumstances, minor nonconsensual surgery does not
violate the fourth or fourteenth amendments.
Past nonconsensual surgery cases have thus demonstrated that the real
problem lies in determining what standard should be used to evaluate when an
individual's usual immunity from bodily intrusions is outweighed by compelling
interests of the state. It is for this reason that this note advances a uniform
standard which a state may use when presented with the problem of noncon-
sensual surgery.
It is submitted that this proposed uniform standard will withstand constitu-
tional challenge. Major nonconsensual surgery should be prohibited as a per se
violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments. If the proposed operation
is medically determined to be minor, then the prosecutor has the burden of
establishing certain specific criteria. If this burden is met, then the state has
shown a compelling need for the evidence, greater than the suspect's need to
preserve his bodily integrity. Under these circumstances, a minor nonconsensual
operation would be constitutionally permissible if it were carried out with the
procedural and medical safeguards embodied in the standard. It is only under
these carefully controlled and limited circumstances that the state may order an
individual to submit to nonconsensual surgery.
John Cain
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